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THE 1996 IMMIGRATION LEGISLATION
AND THE ASSAULT ON THE COURTS*

Lee Gelerntt

INTRODUCTION
In 1996, Congress passed, and President Clinton signed,
two pieces of legislation that made sweeping changes to the
Nation's immigration laws. The first law was the Antiterrorism
and Effective Death Penalty Act ("AEDPA"), enacted on April
24, 1996.' The second law, the Illegal Immigration Reform and
Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 ("IIRIRA"), was enacted
five months later, on September 30, 1996.2
The two Acts contain a number of provisions that have
greatly restricted the substantive rights of immigrants. The
two Acts also include a variety of procedural revisions that
make it substantially more difficult for immigrants to enforce
those rights that do remain in the aftermath of the 1996
legislation. Among the procedural revisions are a number of
"court-strpping" provisions that restrict the power of the
judicial branch to review certain immigration decisions of the
Attorney General. It is these court-stripping provisions on
* ©2001 Lee Gelernt. All Rights Reserved.
t Semor Staff Counsel, ACLU Immigrants' Rights Project. This Essay is a
revised version of a lecture originally given on April 5, 2001, as part of Brooklyn Law
School's annual Edward V Sparer Public Interest Law Fellowship Symposium. At the
time of the lecture, the ACLU was preparing its briefs in two immigration courtstripping cases then pending before the Supreme Court, INS v. St. Cyr and CalcanoMartinez v. INS. Those cases subsequently were decided in June 2001. A postscript has
been added addressing the decisions.
I Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996).
2 Pub. L. No. 104208, Div. C., 110 Stat. 3009-546 (1996).
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which I want to focus, and that, in my view, are the most
troubling provisions in the 1996 laws.
The 1996 court-stripping provisions not only have the
potential to cause enormous hardship to immigrants and their
families, but also raise serious and delicate constitutional
issues, issues that have potentially far-reaching implications
for the Judiciary's role in our tripartite constitutional system.
Indeed, if the Justice Department's interpretation of the 1996
court-stripping provisions is upheld, "itwill be the first time in
the peacetime history of this country in which a resident
immigrant could be arrested, detained, and deported based
solely on the Executive branch's unilateral assurance that it
has complied with the law, without any court, at any time,
reviewing whether the deportation order is fully consistent
with the law What is at stake, therefore, is the prospect of a
radical departure from 200 years of unbroken constitutional
practice and tradition in this country
Rather than focusing too heavily on the pure legal
issues raised by the 1996 court-stripping provisions, I would
like to focus primarily on the practical consequences of these
provisions. First, I want to give a quick sense of who is affected
by the 1996 laws. Next, I want to provide an overview of the
litigation brought by the ACLU Immigrants' Rights Project to
challenge the court-stripping provisions, litigation that has
now reached the Umted States Supreme Court in two
compamon cases, INS v. St. Cyr 3 and Calcano-Martmnez v.
INS.4 Finally, I will briefly discuss some of the strategic
thinking that has gone into litigating the 1996 court-stripping
provisions.
I.

THE COURT-STRIPPING PROVISIONS

The 1996 immigration legislation contains a number of
different provisions designed to restrict the power of the courts
to review the Executive branch's immigration policies and
decisions. I will focus on only one of these court-stripping

3 229 F.3d 406 (2d Cir. 2000), affd, 533 U.S. 289 (2001).
4 232 F.2d 328 (2d Cir. 2000), affd, 533 U.S. 348 (2001).
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provisions-the one most heavily litigated to date and
currently before the Supreme Court in the St. Cyr and
Calcano-Martinezcases.
The provision states that "no court shall have
jurisdiction to review" any deportation order that is based on
one of a specified list of criminal offenses. 5 The wording of the
provision raises a number of subtle interpretive questions, but
for the present discussion I want to put most of those issues to
one side. Instead, I will focus on two overriding points
regarding the practical breadth of the provision.
First, the provision does not apply only to individuals
who are in the country without documentation, so-called
"illegal" immigrants. Rather, it applies to all non-citizens who
have been convicted of one of the listed criminal offenses and
are now subject to deportation on the basis of that conviction.
It applies, therefore, to individuals who entered the country
legally and who have been granted lawful permanent resident
status, a status one step removed from U.S. citizensip. In
street parlance, it applies to "green card" holders.
Included in this group are individuals who have
lawfully resided in this country for years and who have
contributed greatly to the Umted States and their local
commumties, not just through their labor and taxes, but also in
myriad other ways, including service in the U.S. military They
are individuals who may have entered the country when they
were small children, who have lived here continuously for
virtually their entire lives, and who may now lack any genuine
connection to their country of origin, including any familiarity
with the language or customs of that country These are also
individuals who very likely have close family membersincluding spouses and children-living in the Unted States as
either U.S. citizens or lawful permanent residents. In fact, one
of the named parties before the Supreme Court in CalcanoMartnez has four children with U.S. citizenship and has lived
in this country continuously since arriving thirty years ago at
the age of three.
The second point I want to stress about the breadth of
the court-stripping provision concerns the types of crimes to
which it applies. The provision is not linted to the most
5 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C) (2001).
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serious criminal offenses. In fact, just the opposite is true. The
provision also restricts access to the courts for lawful residents
who have committed even minor crimes. As one court noted,
the court-stripping provision would apply to such crimes as
"turnstile jumping" in the subway 6
Moreover, not only does the court-stripping provision
apply to minor crimes, but it also applies regardless of whether
the individual received any prison time. Individuals who
committed offenses that were viewed as too minor to warrant a
day of jail time are thus subject to the court-stripping
provision. Equally sigmficant, the court-strpping provision is
triggered even when the offense was committed years or even
decades ago, perhaps when the individual was only eighteen or
nineteen years old.
In short, the 1996 court-stripping provisions sweep
broadly They affect individuals who have been granted lawful
status in this country, who have committed very minor crimes,
and who have literally spent their entire lives here. Thus,
however one may seek to justify the policy decision to pass the
1996 court-stripping provisions, it cannot be on the ground that
the provisions were narrowly drafted to target only individuals
who lack close ties to this country Nor can the justification be
that the provision affects only those individuals who have
committed the most serious offenses.
I am not suggesting that the Umted States, as a
sovereign nation, lacks the legal authority to deport lawful
residents who have committed minor criminal offenses. Nor is
my focus here on whether the United States should, as a
matter of national policy or basic fairness, deport such
individuals. That is an important discussion, but it is one for
another time. My aim here is simply to ensure that there are
no misconceptions about the sweep of the 1996 court-strpping
provisions.

6 Mojica v. Reno, 970 F Supp. 130, 137 (E.D.N.Y. 1997) (discussing AEDPA §
440(d), which applies to same set of crimes as AEDPA § 440(a), the court-stripping
provision), affd sub nom., Henderson v. I.N.S, 157 F.3d 106 (2d Cir. 1998), cert. denied
sub nom., Reno v. Navas, 526 U.S. 1004 (1999). The court-stripping provisions also
would apply to such minor crimes as misdemeanor theft. See, e.g., United States v.
Pacheco, 225 F.3d 148, 153 (2d Cir. 2000) (holding that larceny constitutes an
"aggravated felony").
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Court stripping is serious business and has been rightly
treated as such since the founding of this Nation. That is
particularly true where, as here, the Justice Department is
seeking to depart from 200 years of constitutional tradition and
to diminsh the judiciary's role to an extent never before seen
in the history of this country Given the seriousness of the
endeavor, any discussion regarding the wisdom of the 1996
court-stripping provisions must be based on a clear sense of
precisely who will be affected.
Let me turn then to the litigation over the courtstripping provisions. As I hope to show, although courtstripping issues may often have an abstract quality about
them, the effect on long-time legal residents will be both
concrete and quite devastating if the government's position
were to prevail.
II.

THE COURT-STRIPPING LITIGATION

The ACLU Immigrants' Rights Project has been
challenging the court-stripping provisions in every circuit in
the country for the past five years, beginning with the passage
of AEDPA in April 1996. It would be next to impossible for me
to describe all the litigation that has taken place over the past
five years, given its national scope and the variety of contexts
in which the court-stripping issues have played out. Let me
focus, therefore, on one specific context in which the courtstripping litigation has arisen most frequently That context
concerns the new "automatic deportation" provisions that were
enacted in 1996 along with the court-stripping provisions. It is
in this context in which the Supreme Court will consider the
court-stripping issue this Term in St. Cyr and CalcanoMartinez.
Prior to 1996, non-citizens who committed criminal
offenses could be deported on the basis of their criminal
conviction. The critical point, however, was that deportation
was not mandatory except in the most serious cases, generally
cases where the individual served at least five years of prison
time for an "aggravated felony" offense. In all other cases, an
administrative
immigration judge could grant lawful
permanent residents who committed criminal offenses a
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"waiver" of deportation, thereby allowing them to remain in the
country and retain their lawful status. In other words,
deportation was not automatic.
To qualify for consideration for a waiver, individuals
had to satisfy two principal criteria set forth by Congress: they
had to be lawful permanent residents and they must have
resided continuously in the United States for at least seven
years. 7 Individuals who met these statutory eligibility criteria
were entitled to apply for a waiver of deportation and to have
their applications adjudicated by immigration judges. An
immigration judge then decided, in the exercise of discretion,
whether to grant the waiver based on a balancing of various
factors, such as the seriousness of the crime, demonstrated
rehabilitation, the number of years the individual has lived in
the United States, the individual's ties to the Umted States
(including the presence of family members living lawfully in
the United States), employment history, community service,
military service, and any other factor that might appropriately
be considered in assessing whether the individual deserved to
remain in the country 8
In the past, the waiver was granted in approximately
fifty percent of the cases. 9 The fact that the waiver was granted
in roughly one out of every two cases is not surprising. To begin
with, the waiver is available only to lawful permanent
residents with at least seven years residence. Moreover, the
immigration laws, even before 1996, cast an exceedingly wide
net and thus subject individuals with even minor offenses to
deportation. The power to grant a waiver to long-time lawful
residents gave immigration judges the ability to tailor the law
to individual circumstances and to avoid unnecessarily harsh
consequences. The waiver was thus an indispensable feature of
the deportation process, providing some assurance that the
system would operate fairly and humanely, and would not
7The immigration laws contain several different forms of "waivers." The
waiver discussed above and the one at issue in the court-stripping cases before the
Supreme Court is commonly referred to as a "212(c)" waiver. See Immigration and
Naturalization Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c) (1994) (repealed by IIRIRA).
8 See, e.g., Matter of Matin, 16 I. & N. Dec. 581, 585, 1978 WL 36472 (1978)
(listing factors).
9 See Goncalves v. Reno, 144 F.3d 110, 128 (1st Cir. 1998) (citing
Justice Department statistics), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1004 (1999).
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result in the deportation of long-time lawful permanent
residents who have committed only minor crimes, who have
substantial ties to this country, and for whom the Umted
States is the only country they (and their children) may have
ever known.
In 1996, the situation changed dramatically. Congress
eliminated the possibility of waivers in almost all cases and
enacted substantive provisions mandating that deportation
would now be automatw in virtually all cases where the
individual had been convicted of a crinnal offense, even for
those who committed only minor crimes and had not served a
day of jail time. These new automatic deportation provisions
would have had drastic consequences if the Attorney General
had sought to apply them only prospectively But the Attorney
General took the position that the new provisions should be
applied in all cases-prospectively and retroactively-even if
the crime had been committed decades ago.
Immigrants with pre-1996 crimes who were denied the
right to apply for a waiver immediately went to court and
argued that the Attorney General had misinterpreted the 1996
laws by applying the new automatic deportation provisions
retroactively to cases involving pre-1996 events. The Justice
Department defended the Attorney General's decision to apply
the new provisions retroactively, arguing that the Attorney
General had correctly interpreted the new deportation
provisions to apply both prospectively and retroactively More
fundamentally, however, the Justice Department offered a
threshold jurisdictional defense. It argued that the 1996 courtstripping provisions eliminated the power of the courts to
review the Attorney General's decision to apply the new
automatic deportation provisions retroactively
According to the Justice Department, it now had the
unilateral and unreviewable power to arrest, physically detain
and deport long-time lawful permanent residents based solely
on the Attorney General's interpretation of the new automatic
deportation laws, and no court, including the U.S. Supreme
Court, could review the legality of the deportation, even by
habeas corpus. Thus, even if it were manifestly clear to a
federal court that Congress had never intended to apply these
automatic deportation provisions retroactively, the Justice
Department's view is that the courts are powerless to correct

BROOKLYN LAWREVIEW

[Vol. 67" 2

the error and must stand by while long-time lawful residents
are detained and deported based on a mistaken interpretation
of the law
If the government's jurisdictional position were to
prevail, it will mean that the Justice Department would
effectively serve the dual role of prosecutor and judge. The
Attorney General would decide which immigrants to place into
deportation proceedings, would then prosecute their cases, and
if any dispute arose during that prosecution as to the meamng
of the automatic deportation laws, would unilaterally resolve
those disputes. The prospect of an executive agency acting in
this dual role as prosecutor and judge is troubling under any
circumstances. It is particularly unsettling where an
individual's liberty is at stake and the Attorney General is
under enormous political pressure to enforce the Nation's
immigration laws. As the Supreme Court has made clear,
court-stripping provisions will be viewed with less disfavor in
areas that are "relatively immune from political pressures."10
That is plainly not the case in the politically and emotionally
charged area of immigration.
To be clear, the ACLU has never argued, and is not
argmng before the Supreme Court, that any immigrant has a
right to be granted a waiver. The ACLU is arguing only that
the lawful residents in these cases have a right to apply for a
waiver and that Congress never intended to eliminate this
right retroactively If we prevail, it will not mean that
individuals are entitled to remain in the country, but only that
these individuals will have an opportumty to appear before an
immigration judge in the hope of persuading the judge that
they deserve continued residence in the Umted States. If, on
the other hand, the government's position prevails, then
potentially thousands of legal immigrants will be subject to
mandatory and automatic deportation, with all the hardship
that such deportations entail.
The lower federal courts have overwhelmingly rejected
the government's arguments and have held that the 1996
court-stripping provisions do not leave the courts powerless to
review the Attorney General decision to apply the new
automatic deportation provisions retroactively Specifically, the
10 Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 855 (1986).
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courts of appeals have concluded, as a matter of statutory
construction, that although the 1996 court-stripping provisions
eliminated most forms of judicial review, the provisions did not
eliminate habeas corpus review-the historic means of testing
whether individuals have been unlawfully deprived of their
liberty Importantly, the courts have also stressed that the
court-stripping provisions would have raised serious
constitutional concerns had they eliminated all avenues of
review, including habeas corpus, over the Attorney General's
interpretation of a federal law 11
The courts of appeals have also overwhelmingly rejected
the government's position on the merits and have held that the
Attorney General erred in finding that the new automatic
deportation provisions are fully retroactive. Although the lower
courts have arrived at differing conclusions about whether the
new automatic deportation provisions might be applied in a
11 The circuit decisions fall into two basic categories: those involving AEDPA's
and/or IIRA's "transitional" jurisdictional rules, and those involving IIRIRAs
permanent provisions, which generally apply to cases in which administrative
immigration proceedings commenced on or after April 1, 1997. See Henderson, 157 F.3d
at 117-18 n.7 (noting effective dates for the three sets of provisions), cert denied sub
nom., Reno v. Navas, 526 U.S. 1004 (1999). The three sets of provisions present the
same basic issues. The cases before the Supreme Court, St. Cyr and Calcano-Martinez,
fall under IIRIRA's permanent provisions; the Court demed certiorari in the cases
governed by AEDPA's and/or IRIRNs transitional rules.
Cases under IIRIRA's permanent rules finding habeas jurisdiction: Mahadeo
v. Reno, 226 F.3d 3 (1st Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 121 S. Ct. 2590 (2001); I.N.S. v. St.
Cyr, 229 F.3d 406 (2d Cir. 2000), offd, 533 U.S. 289 (2001); Calcano-Martinez v. INS,
232 F.3d 328 (2d Cir. 2000), affd, 533 U.S. 348 (2001); LiAang v. INS, 206 F.3d 308 (3d
Cir. 2000), cert. denied sub nom., Rodriguez v. INS, 121 S. Ct. 2590 (2001); FloresMiramontes v. INS, 212 F.3d 1133 (9th Cir. 2000). But see Max-George v. Reno, 205
F.3d 194 (5th Cir. 2000), vacated, 121 S. Ct. 2585 (2001); Richardson v. Reno, 180 F.3d
1311 (11th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S.Ct. 1529 (2000).
Cases under AEDPA's and HRIRA's transitional provisions finding habeas
jurisdiction include: Kolster v. INS, 101 F.3d 785 (1st Cir. 1996); Goncalves v. Reno,
144 F.3d 110 (1st Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1004 (1999); Henderson v. INS, 157
F.3d 106 (2d Cir. 1998), cert denied sub nom., Reno v Navas, 526 U.S. 1004 (1999);
Sandoval v. Reno, 166 F.3d 225 (3d Cir. 1999); Bownn v. INS, 194 F.3d 483 (4th Cir.
1999); Requena-Rodrguez v. Pasquarell, 190 F.3d 299 (5th Cir. 1999); Pak v. Reno, 196
F.3d 666 (6th Cir. 1999); Shah v. Reno, 184 F.3d 719 (8th Cir. 1999); Magana-Pizano v.
INS, 200 F.3d 603 (9th Cir. 1999); Jurado-Gutierrez v. Greene, 190 F.3d 1135 (10th
Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1041 (2000); Mayers v. INS, 175 F.3d 1289 (11th Cir.
1999). See also Lee v. Reno, 15 F Supp. 2d 26 (D.C.D.C. 1998). But see LaGuerre v.
Reno, 164 F.3d 1035 (7th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 120 S.Ct. 1157 (2000) (finding no
habeas jurisdiction, but reserving question whether Attorney General's decision may
be reviewed by petition for review in the court of appeals).
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partially retroactive fashion, no circuit has accepted the
Attorney General's position that these new provisions are fully
12
retroactive and apply to all cases.
Of course, in the absence of the threshold finding that
the courts retained jurisdiction to review the Attorney
General's legal rulings, none of these retroactivity rulings
would have been possible. Long-time legal residents would
have been deported automatically and the courts would have
been powerless to stop the deportations, despite the fact that
the courts have now concluded that Congress never authorized
full retroactive application of the new automatic deportation
provisions.
III.

THE ACLU's LITIGATION STRATEGY

Finally, I have been asked to discuss briefly some of the
strategic thinking that has gone into litigatmg these courtstripping cases. Needless to say, the ACLU has had to make
countless tactical and strategic decisions over the past five
years of litigation. As an initial matter, we obviously had to
develop and choose among legal arguments to present to the
courts. But presenting the pure legal arguments was only part
of our task. We also wanted to tell the courts the "story" of our
court-stripping cases: what the cases are about in practical
terms, why the issues are important, what is fundamentally at
stake, and what the consequences are for the affected
individuals if the court rules against them. What I want to
discuss here concerns how we ultimately chose to characterize
12 Cases under IIRA's permanent rules include I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 229 F.3d
406 (2d Cir. 2000), affd, 533 U.S. 289 (2001); Jideonwo v. INS, 224 F.3d 692 (7th Cir.
2000).
Cases decided under AEDPA's and IIRIRA's transitional provisions
sustaining a retroactivity challenge: Goncalves v. Reno, 144 F.3d 110 (1st Cir. 1998),
cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1004 (1999); Henderson v. INS, 157 F.3d 106 (2d Cir. 1998), cert.
denied sub nom., Reno v Navas, 526 U.S. 1004 (1999); Sandoval v. Reno, 166 F.3d 225
(3d Cir. 1999); Bowrin v. INS, 194 F.3d 483 (4th Cir. 1999); Pak v. Reno, 196 F.3d 666
(6th Cir. 1999); Shah v. Reno, 184 F.3d 719 (8th Cir. 1999); Magana-Pizano v. INS, 200
F.3d 603 (9th Cir. 1999); Jurado-Gutierrez v. Greene, 190 F.3d 1135 (10th Cir. 1999),
cert. dented, 529 U.S. 1041 (2000); Mayers v. INS, 175 F.3d 1289 (lith Cir. 1999). But
see DeSousa v. Reno, 190 F.3d 175 (3d Cir. 1999); Requena-Rodriguez v. Pasquarell,
190 F.3d 299 (5th Cir. 1999); LaGuerre v. Reno, 164 F.3d 1035 (7th Cir. 1998), cert.
dented, 528 U.S. 1153 (2000).
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the issues in our court-strippmg cases, i.e., what story we
ultimately chose to tell the courts.
Deciding how to frame one's case so that it appears
compelling in human terms can be a difficult task, often
considerably more difficult than developing the strictly legal
arguments. In the court-stnppmg cases, at least three factors
made the task even more difficult. First, for reasons I will
discuss, we were not able to control the flow of the litigation.
Second, as I have already suggested, court-stnppmg issues can
have a technical, abstract feel to them, even for federal judges
accustomed to dealing with such issues, and thus, do not
always lend themselves to compelling storytelling. Third, our
cases had several potential stones worth telling. That may
seem like a luxury rather than a problem, but in the end the
prospect of choosing the wrong story, or choosing to tell too
many stories, may have been what caused us the greatest
concern.
We ultimately chose to tell the following three stones:
(1) the life stories of the individual petitioners in the cases
directly before the court; (2) the broader story of how the 1996
legislation affected the immigrant community as a whole; and
(3) the story of judicial review in the United States and the
institutional role our courts have historically played in
protecting the rights of vulnerable groups, including
immigrants.
The challenge for us was to decide how best to tell each
story and to convey to the courts what in our view was most
fundamentally troubling about the 1996 court-strippmg
provisions. I cannot recreate all of our thinking, but let me try
and give you a quick sense of how we viewed each of the three
stones.
The first and narrowest story is the story of the
individual immigrant petitioners: What were the petitioners'
lives like before the 1996 legislation, what has happened to
them as a result of the legislation, and most importantly, what
will happen to them in the future if the courts rule in favor of
the government? The story of the individual petitioners
obviously needed to be told, as it almost always does in every
case. The question, then, was not whether we were going to tell
this story, but the pronnnence to give it.
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Ultimately, we chose not to focus too heavily on the
specific facts of the individual petitioners. As an intial matter,
it seemed to us that the court-stripping issues raised concerns
that went well beyond the facts of any given individual and
that an inordinate amount of attention on individual
petitioners potentially could deflect the court from these
broader issues. We therefore believed that a broader story had
to be told. The best way to tell a broad story in a given case is,
of course, through concrete, specific examples, and generally,
those examples would and should be based on the
circumstances of the individual petitioners who are actually
before the court. The problem for us, however, was that we did
not control the flow of the litigation, and thus, could not be
certain that the test cases that intially reached the courts
would involve representative petitioners who would illustrate
the larger, fundamental concerns at stake.
The reason we could not control the flow of litigation
was principally because of the nature of immigration law,
which put us in a purely defensive litigating posture.
Immigrants receive individual deportation hearings before
immigration judges, whose decisions are then appealable to the
Board of Immigration Appeals. Any judicial review of the final
adminstrative decision generally would be through an appeal
on behalf of the individual. At the tne the 1996 laws were
passed, there were probably hundreds of individual
immigration cases pending in the federal courts. When the
1996 legislation went into effect, the Justice Department
invoked the new court-stripping provisions in many, if not
most, of these cases, making each one a potential test case. We
had to react defensively, find the cases that happened to be
moving the qickest through the federal courts, and litigate the
court-stripping issue in those cases.
Because the Attorney General was a party in each of the
cases, the Justice Department was at least aware of each case.
But even the Justice Department could not completely control
the flow of cases. For the most part, the order in which cases
arose was out of anyone's control and depended simply on
where in the pipeline an individual case happened to fall when
the 1996 legislation passed. Given the possibility that the cases
that happened to reach the courts first might not involve
representative petitioners whose stores would illustrate the
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larger legal and practical issues raised by court-stripping
provisions, we decided against devising an entire national
litigation strategy that would significantly depend on the facts
of a particular case. We concluded, therefore, that we had to
tell two broader stones in addition to whatever story we were
able to tell about the individual petitioners in each case.
The first of these broader stories concerned the effect
the new laws would have on the imnigrant commumty as a
whole. Part of this story was simply to describe the broad
sweep of the court-stripping provisions and to explain who in
the immigrant commumty potentially would be affected by
these provisions. Thus, as I have previously mentioned, we had
to make certain that the courts understood that the provisions
covered long-time lawful permanent residents who may have
committed only minor crnmes decades ago and who have
significant ties to this country But we also had to do more
than simply describe the breadth of the provisions. We had to
move from the abstract to the concrete and specific, and to
convey as best we could the immense hardship that would be
imposed on immigrant commumties throughout the country if
the government prevailed in this litigation. Our challenge was
to ensure that the human side of what was occurring was not
obscured by a blur of aggregate statistics and overlygeneralized images about the immigrant community
Toward that end, what we have sought to convey to the
courts is that because of the 1996 laws there are now families
in every immigrant community throughout the United States
sitting down at kitchen tables having profound conversations
about their futures. The individuals affected by the new laws
are explaining to their spouses and children that they may face
deportation for something they did many years ago and that,
as a consequence, their families may have to make a choice.
One choice for these families is to move together to a new
country and remain as a family, even if it means moving to a
country that their spouses and children have never visited and
that these individuals left decades ago; indeed, the children
and spouses may be U.S. citizens who have lived here their
entire lives and for whom moving to a small, possibly
impoverished, country in Eastern Europe, Asia, Central
America, Africa, or the Middle East was previously
unimaginable. Alternatively, the family can choose to do what
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immigrant families from every ethnic group in every
generation have done for hundreds of years. They can allow
their children to remain in the United States, either with the
remaining spouse or with other family members, in the hope
that the children will have the opportunity for a better lifeeven if it means that they will not be there to watch their
children grow up.
Children and spouses will inevitably ask why after all
this time deportation is necessary The answer will be that the
Justice Department has decided that deportation is now
automatic and mandatory for individuals who have committed
certain crimes, regardless of how long ago the crime was
committed, how minor the crime may have been, or how much
their spouses and children may depend upon them. This, in
turn, will provoke the next logical question: If you think the
decision is wrong, why can't you "go before a judge" and explain
the situation? That this last question is routinely asked should
not be surprising. For immigrants, it is the very right to go
before a judge that, in their minds, is one of the features that
critically separates the United States from other countries that
lack the same commitment to the rule of law They feel
viscerally what Justice Frankfurter observed long ago-that
"[t]he history of American freedom is, in no small measure, the
13
history of procedure."
This leads me to the final story that we have sought to
tell the courts-the history of judicial review in the United
States, both generally and with respect specifically to
immigrants. The story is a familiar one. The Framers believed
in an independent judiciary that would not fear reprisal from
political majorities. Over the years, the judiciary has been
criticized from all sides. Some believe the courts have moved
too slowly to enforce the rights of unpopular groups, while
others have argued that the judiciary has overstepped its
bounds. By and large, however, the Framers' vision has proved
extraordinary No matter how politically unpopular or
vulnerable any individual or group may be in this country, they
have been able to enforce their rights because our

13 Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 414 (1945).
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constitutional system has allowed the courts to serve their vital
and constitutionally-assigned checking role over the two
political branches.
We have not attempted to tell every aspect of our
country's judicial review story, nor could we do so given its long
and complicated history. Instead, we have focused largely on
providing the courts with some measure of historical
perspective to make them aware of the unprecedented nature
of the government's position.
In particular, we have sought to provide the courts with
an historical overview of immigration law and policy in this
country That history reveals a country that has welcomed
immigrants and celebrated their contributions like no other
nation in the world. But it also reveals a country with a cyclical
hostility toward newcomers that has resulted in bitter, vicious
bigotry toward every immigrant group when they first arrived
in the United States. And with this hostility has often come
restrictive new laws, including court-stnppmg laws designed to
insulate the immigration process from judicial scrutiny Yet
even during the most virulent periods of anti-immigrant
hostility, an unflinching judiciary rejected every attempt to
short-circuit the system and abandon the principle of judicial
review in response to ephemeral popular passions or perceived
short-term gains.
Thus, as I have already emphasized, if the government's
interpretation of the 1996 court-strippmg provisions were to
prevail, it would be the first time in this country's history that
resident immigrants could be taken into custody, deprived of
their liberty, and then deported without having a full
opportunity to test the legality of their custody and deportation
in court. A departure of that magnitude from our constitutional
traditions should give us all pause.
Nor is the historical significance limited to the
immigration area. There simply has never been a time in this
country's history during which any individual, citizen or
immigrant, could be deprived of his or her liberty without
access to the courts to test the legality of the government's
actions. At a minmum, the Great Writ of habeas corpus,
inherited from England and enshrined in our Constitution, has
always been available during peacetime.
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Of course, none of these stories matters if the law is
clear-cut, but rarely is that the situation in cases that find
their way to the Supreme Court. More often than not, there
will be some degree of ambiguity in the relevant legal texts. It
is in tins context in which the stories we have tried to tell will
hopefully make some difference, not by appealing to the
individual policy preferences and sympathies of the judges and
Justices, but by helping to illuminate the values underlying the
govermng legal texts and by showing what Congress may have
been thinking when it enacted the 1996 laws.
Thus, for example, the fact that the government's
jurisdictional position would create an unprecedented situation
in American history may militate strongly in favor of the Court
requiring express and unmistakable evidence that Congress
intended to depart so radically from our constitutional
traditions. Similarly, the fact that the government's
interpretation of the 1996 automatic deportation laws would
cause such enormous hardship to the immigrant community
might lead the Court to assume that Congress did not intend
such a result in the absence of clear and unambiguous evidence
of that intent in the text of the new law In the end, however, it
remains to be seen whether the Supreme Court will find the
1996 laws ambiguous in any respect, and if so, whether any of
the themes that I have discussed will influence the Court's
view of how that ambiguity should be resolved.
CONCLUSION
In his celebrated dialogue on the federal courts,
Professor Henry Hart suggested that the courts must remain
open for any individual, citizen or immigrant, who is
threatened with a loss of liberty, and that any peacetime law
that barred access to the courts in such a situation would be
unconstitutional. In his view, however, the issue was largely an
academic one because he did not envision a time when
Congress would ever enact such a law Presciently, though, he
observed that if the issue ever did arise, immigrants might
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provide the constitutional testing crucible given their political
vulnerability and their already-dimimshed constitutional
status.

14

Now, after more than 200 years of our Nation's
constitutional history, the government is arguing that
Congress had finally taken this extraordinary step. The stakes
are thus high. We are hopeful that the Supreme Court will
reject the government's position and reaffirm the bedrock
principle that no individual may be deprived of his or her
liberty without access to the courts. That would be a victory not
just for immigrants and their families, but also for the Nation's
commitment to maintaining a constitutional democracy based
on the rule of law-a commitment that has now withstood
challenge for more than two centuries.
POSTSCRIPT
On June 25, 2001, the Supreme Court issued its
decisions in St. Cyr 15 and Calcano-Martinez.16 The Court ruled,
five to four, against the government on both the court-stripping
and retroactiviy issues.
The jurisdictional question before the Court was
whether the courts have jurisdiction to review the Attorney
General's decision to apply the new automatic deportation
provisions retroactively That question, in turn, raised two
distinct issues. The first concerned the proper mechanism and
forum to challenge the Attorney General's retroactivity
decision-a district court habeas corpus action under the
general federal habeas statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2241,17 or a
"petition for review" filed in the court of appeals directly from
the Board of Immigration Appeals (the primary means since
1961 of challenging a deportation order). On this issue, the
Court concluded that IIRIRA's jurisdictional provisions barred
the courts of appeals from reviewing the Attorney General's
14

Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction

of Federal Courts:An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1362, 1396-98 (1953). See
also td. at 1388-91.
15 533 U.S. 289, 121 S. Ct. 2271 (2001).
16 533 U.S. 348, 121 S. Ct. 2268 (2001).
17 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (2001).
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retroactivity decision by means of a petition for review, and
that insofar as review of the Attorney General's decision
remained available, it must be sought in a district court habeas
action.' 8 The Court then squarely rejected the government's
position that IIRIRA's jurisdictional provisions had eliminated
access to § 2241 and stressed that, under its prior precedents, §
2241 habeas jurisdiction could be repealed only by an express
and unambiguous directive, a directive the Court found lacking
in the 1996 legislation. 19 Accordingly, the Court held in St. Cyr
that the immngrant in that case had properly sought review in
a district court habeas action.2 0 The Court also issued a short,
separate opinion in Calcano-Martinez dismissing for lack of
jurisdiction the petitions for review filed by the three
21
immigrants in that case.
The second jurisdictional issue confronted by the Court
was whether the scope of review in a § 2241 habeas action
encompassed a challenge to the Attorney General's decision to
apply the new automatic deportation provisions retroactively,
t.e., a statutory (non-constitutional) claim challenging whether
St. Cyr was eligible to apply for a discretionary waiver of
deportation. The Court did not dispute that the 1996
jurisdictional provisions had restricted federal jurisdiction and
acknowledged that immigrants deportable on the basis of
certain criminal offenses (those enumerated in 8 U.S.C. §
1252(a)(2)(C)) were likely no longer entitled to the same type of
broad judicial review that previously had been available under
the Immigration and Nationality Act.22 But the Court held that
St. Cyr's statutory challenge was nonetheless reviewable.
The Court noted that although the ultimate grant or
demal of a waiver was within the discretion of the Attorney
General, St. Cyr was not challenging the Attorney General's
exercise of discretion, but rather, whether he was statutorily
eligible to apply for the waiver. Thus, the Court stressed that
St. Cyr's challenge to the Attorney General's retroactivity
decision raised a pure question of law regarding the proper
18 Calcano-Martinez,121 S. Ct. at 2269-70; St. Cyr, 121 S. Ct. at 2283-87.
19 St. Cyr, 121 S. Ct. at 2278-80, 2283-87.
20
Id. at 2283-87.
21 Calcano-Martinez,121 S. Ct. at 2269 (stating that petitioners must proceed
with habeas petitions if they wish to obtain relief).
22 St. Cyr, 121 S. Ct. at 2283-87.
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interpretation of a federal statute and that review of nonconstitutional questions of law were authorized by the plain
terms of § 2241.23 The Court also undertook a comprehensive
historical analysis of habeas precedent and found that
questions of law historically had been reviewable in both the
immigration and non-immigration areas. As the Court noted,
habeas junsdiction under the general federal habeas corpus
statute has been available since 1789 and has routinely been
available for non-citizens to challenge deportation and
exclusion orders, even during those periods when Congress had
eliminated all review except that required by the
Constitution.24 Finally, and significantly, the
Court
emphasized that the absence of review over a pure question of
law concerning the proper interpretation of a federal statute
would raise substantial constitutional questions and that these
constitutional concerns strongly militated in favor of
construing the 1996 legislation to permit review 25
Having found habeas jurisdiction in St. Cyr's case, the
Court turned to the merits. The Court noted that the waiver
provision under which St. Cyr had sought relief from
deportation 26 had been repealed by IIRIRA as of April 1, 1997
(HIRIRA's general effective date)2 7 and that St. Cyr had been
placed into adimstrative immigration proceedings after that
date.2 8 The Court further noted that the new waiver provisions
created by IIRIRA applied to an extremely narrow class of
immigrants 29 and that St. Cyr was not eligible to apply for a
23

24

Id. at 2275-78, 2283-84.

Id. at 2279-84.
Id. at 2279-82, 2287. That jurisdiction over deportation decisions need
not be as broad as that authorized by the Administrative Procedure Act ('APA"), and
that it can be limited to the comparatively narrower scope of review available m
habeas corpus, is unremarkable and consistent with historical precedent. Congress
began regulating immigration m 1875. In 1891, Congress began passing a series of
"finality" provisions which had the effect of eliminating all review except "insofar as
required by the Constitution." Heikkila v. Barber, 345 U.S. 229, 234-35 (1953). These
finality provisions governed for more than sixty years, until passage of the 1952
Immigration and Nationality Act. During this sixty year period, the Court consistently
affirmed an alien's right to habeas corpus review, but also rejected attempts by aliens
to obtain broader review, such as that authorized by the APA- Heikkila, 345 U.S. at
234-35; St. Cyr, 121 S. Ct. at 2281-84.
26 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c) (1997) (repealed).
27 St. Cyr, 121 S. Ct. at 2287. See also id. at 2275-78.
28
Id. at 2275, 2287.
29
Id. at 2277.
25
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waiver under these new waiver provisions.3 0 But the Court
rejected the Attorney General's position that relief under the
old waiver provision was no longer available for any individual
placed into immigration proceedings after April 1, 1997 The
Court held that the repeal of the old waiver provisions did not
apply retroactively to all cases commenced after April 1, 1997,
and that St. Cyr, who had pled guilty to hIs deportable
criminal offense prior to passage of AEDPA and IIRIRA,
remained eligible to apply for a waiver of deportation under the
31
pre-1996 provision.
In holding that St. Cyr remained eligible to apply for a
waiver under the pre-1996 laws, the Court applied the familiar
two-step retroactivity test.8 2 Under this test, the Court stressed
that application of the new waiver laws to St. Cyr's case would
have a retroactive effect and thus could not be applied to him
in the absence of an express and unambiguous directive in the
statute-a directive the Court found lacking.33 Among other
factors, the Court noted that St. Cyr's pre-AEDPAIIIRIRA
conviction had been pursuant to a plea agreement and that
immigrants may have entered into pre-Act pleas on the
understanding that pleading guilty would not subject them to
34
automatic deportation.
Because St. Cyr's pre-AEDPA/IIRIRA conviction had
been pursuant to a plea agreement, the Court had no occasion
to decide any of the other possible factual permutations on the
retroactivity issue, such as whether immigrants could seek
relief under the old waiver provisions if their preAEDPA/IIRIRA convictions had not been pursuant to a plea
agreement, or whether relief under the old waiver provisions
remained available for immigrants whose criminal conduct, but
not convictions, occurred before passage of AEDPA and
IIRIRA. Importantly, however, the Court provided significant
guidance on these remaining issues. In particular, the Court
rejected the government's attempt to place immigration in a
separate category for purposes of retroactivity analysis and
30 Id.
31 St. Cyr, .121 S. Ct. at 2293.
32 See Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244 (1994); St. Cyr, 121 S. Ct.
at 2287-88, 2290 (setting forth the two-step test).
33 St. Cyr, 121 S. Ct. at 2287-93.
34
Id. at 2291-93.
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made clear that the Court's general retroactivty jurisprudence
applies with equal force to immigration legislation.3 5 Thus, any
further government attempts to apply the new waiver laws
retroactively to cases involving pre-AEDPA/IIRIRA events
must be analyzed in light of the same strong presumption
against retroactive legislation that governs in other areas of
the law
The Court's decisions prompted separate dissents from
Justices Scalia and O'Connor. Justice Scalia, joined by Chief
Justice Rhenquist and Justice Thomas, dissented on the
jurisdictional issue, without reaching the merits of the
Attorney General's retroactivity decision.36 Justice Scalia
argued that the 1996 legislation had eliminated all means of
reviewing the Attorney General's retroactivity decision,
including a district court habeas corpus action under 28 U.S.c.
§ 2241, 3 7 and that the complete preclusion of review was
constitutional under the Suspension Clause for two principal
38
reasons.
As an initial matter, Justice Scalia argued broadly that
the 1996 legislation's restrictions on judicial review did not
violate the Suspension Clause because Congress in the 1996
Acts "has not temporarily withheld operation of the writ, but
has permanently altered its content."39 In Justice Scalia's view,
"To 'suspend' the writ was not to fail to enact it, much less to
refuse to accord it particular content."40 To suspend the writ
was, rather, to "temporarily but entirely elimmat[e] the
'Privilege of the Writ' for a certain geographic area or areas, or
for a certain class or classes of mdividuals."4 1 He contended
that this latter problem was "a distinct abuse of majority
power, and one that had manifested itself often in the Framers'
experience.
"42 Justice Scalia's second and narrower
argument was that the Suspension Clause did not guarantee
35

Id. at 2292-93.

Calcano-Martinez,121 S. Ct. at 2271.
St. Cyr, 121 S. Ct. at 2293-98.
Justice Scalia rejected out of hand any suggestion that the preclusion
of review raised constitutional problems under the Due Process Clause or Article 1U.
Id. at 2302-04.
39
Id.at 2300.
40 Id. at 2999.
41
Id.
42 St. Cyr, 121 S. Ct. at 2999.
36 St. Cyr, 121 S. Ct. at 2293;
37
38
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review of the Attorney General's decision because the
petitioners conceded they were deportable on the basis of their
prior criminal convictions and were challenging only whether
they were eligible to apply for a waiver of deportation, a form of
relief whose ultimate grant or demal rested in the discretion of
43
the Attorney General.
Justice O'Connor also dissented on the jurisdictional
issue without reaching the merits." Like Justice Scalia, she
believed that the 1996 legislation repealed all jurisdiction over
the Attorney General's retroactivity decision and that the total
preclusion of review was constitutional. She found it
unnecessary, however, to address Justice Scalia's broad
constitutional contention regarding the circumstances under
which restrictions on habeas corpus constitute a "suspension"
of the writ, and instead rested her dissent solely on the
narrower ground offered by Justice Scalia-that petitioners
were challenging their eligibility for a discretionary form of
relief, and not the threshold finding that they had committed a
45
deportable offense.
The Court's 5-4 decisions in St. Cyr and CalcanoMartinez have given hope to thousands of immigrants and
their families throughout the Nation. More broadly, the
decisions represent a sweeping affirmation of the constitutional
values and principles that had come under attack as a result of
the 1996 legislation-values and principles that were held in
especially high esteem by the Framers.
Indeed, before passage of the Bill of Rights in 1791, the
Constitution as originally enacted by the Framers in 1787
included few specific protections for individual rights. Notably,
however, two of the individual rights it did include were
protection against suspension of the writ of habeas corpus

46

and protection against retroactive legislation.47 The Court's
43 Id. at 2301-03.

44 Id. at 2293; Calcano-Martinez,121 S. Ct. at 2270.
45 St. Cyr, 121 S. Ct. at 2293.
46

Suspension Clause, U.S. CONST., art. I, § 9, cl. 2.

47 Ex Post Facto Clause, U.S. CONST., art. I, § 10, cl. 1. The Supreme Court

has held that the Ex Post Facto Clause does not apply to civil immigration legislation.
See, e.g., Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 594 (1952). Consequently, the Ex
Post Facto Clause was not directly implicated in the St Cyr and Calcano-Martinez
cases. However, even in cases not strictly governed by the Ex Post Facto Clause, the
Court frequently has looked to its Ex Post Facto jurisprudence to illuminate the
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decisions protecting these two bedrock constitutional principles
would thus have been significant under any circumstances.
The decisions are particularly impressive because they
protected these cherished rights on behalf of a disadvantaged
and politically vulnerable class of individuals whose only
recourse was to turn to the best traditions of the federal courts.

general anti-retroactivity principle embodied by the Clause, and has stressed that the
general principle has long and deep roots in our country, dating back to English
common law. See, e.g., Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States ex rel. Schumer, 520 U.S.
939, 948 (1997); St. Cyr, 121 S. Ct. at 2288 (noting that "presumption against
retroactive legislation is deeply rooted in our jurisprudence, and embodies a legal
doctrine centuries older than our Republic") (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted). See also St. Cyr, 121 S.Ct. at 2293 (relying on Coures Ex Post Facto Clause
decision in Lindsey v. Washington, 301 U.S. 397 (1937)).

